http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50300
in 2009, no clear consensus over the taliban's threat could be reached during the debate on war escalation, even as the taliban made some inroads from the afghan border into pakistan's tribal areas, a trend that was obviously cause for concern, though it should be kept in perspective according to various accounts written then, such as this time article:WASHINGTON, Feb 11, 2010 (IPS) - Evidence now available from various sources, including recently declassified U.S. State Department documents, shows that the Taliban regime led by Mullah Mohammad Omar imposed strict isolation on Osama bin Laden after 1998 to prevent him from carrying out any plots against the United States. The evidence contradicts the claims by top officials of the Barack Obama administration that Mullah Omar was complicit in Osama bin Laden's involvement in the al Qaeda plot to carry out the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sep. 11, 2001. It also bolsters the credibility of Taliban statements in recent months asserting that it has no interest in al Qaeda's global jihadist aims.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ ... 67,00.html
U.S. leaders began sounding the alarm last week when the militants, buoyed by a peace agreement that put them into effective control of the Swat Valley, extended their reach...
The (Pakistani) generals don't share Clinton's view of the Taliban as some sort of external force invading territory the Pakistani military is obliged to protect; on the contrary, odious though it may be to the country's established political class and to the urban population that lives in the 21st century, the movement appears to be rooted in Pakistan's social fabric. The Taliban's recent advances have been accomplished in no small part through recruiting locals to its cause by exploiting long-standing resentment toward the venal local judicial and administrative authorities that prop up a feudal social order.
something else that you rarely hear discussed: is there evidence that the war, if anything, is accelerating pakistan's radicalization? the heavily-populated punjab area has seen a rise in militancy roughly corresponding with the latest military buildup. (although perhaps no irrefutable evidence exists to prove direct causality). from today, this article from the conservative (yes, conservative) weekly standard:What's more, if the Taliban's goal were to seize state power rather than local control, it would have little hope of doing so. The insurgency is largely confined to ethnic Pashtuns, who comprise little more than 15% of the population. It is unlikely to find significant resonance in the major cities such as Islamabad and Lahore . . . While the Taliban is reported to have made some inroads in southern Punjab and has linked up with small militant groups based in the province, it remains a minor presence in those parts of the country where the majority of Pakistanis live. Even in the most generous assessments of their fighting strength, they are very lightly armed and outnumbered by the army by a ratio of more than 50 to 1.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/new ... 53981.html
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2011/ ... -al-qaeda/Rising militancy in Punjab poses a more serious threat to Pakistan's stability and American national security . . . It is against this backdrop that Western counterterrorism myopia becomes evident. For the past decade, the United States has focused its counterterrorism efforts in the region on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and surrounding tribal areas.
(Feb.7, 2011):
The Afghan Taliban would be ready to break with al Qaeda in order to reach a negotiated settlement to the Afghan war, and to ensure Afghanistan is not used as a base for international terrorism, according to a report by Kandahar-based researche rs Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, released by New York University.
It says that the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda was strained both before and after the September 11 2001 attacks, partly because of their very different ideological roots. Al Qaeda grew out of militant Islamism in the Middle East, notably in Egypt, which — when fused with the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan — created its own view of global jihad. Taliban leaders grew up in rural southern Afghanistan, isolated from world events. Many were too young to play a big role in the Afghan jihad, and had no close ties to al Qaeda until after they took power in 1996. “Many Taliban leaders of the older generation are still potential partners for a negotiated settlement. They are not implacably opposed to the U.S. or West in general but to specific actions or policies in Afghanistan. These figures now understand the position of the international community much better than they did before 2001.
The NYU report argues, however, that military operations designed to fragment the Taliban may be making talks harder rather than easier by creating younger, more radicalised fighters less open to a peace deal. It says the U.S. policy of targeting mid-level commanders, along with arrests in Pakistan of senior leaders, is undercutting the old leadership and paving the way for a younger generation more open to al Qaeda. Indeed back in 2009, Taliban statements were already indicating evidence of a rift with al Qaeda. Some time when the history books are written, we will have to ask why that rift was not seized upon at the time, and indeed whether a negotiated settlement could have been achieved without the intensified fighting of 2010. . . “
and there is this analysis from one of the world's leading think tanks on security from last fall (guardian uk): "al qaeda and taliban threat is exaggerated..."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/se ... fghanistan
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/al-qaeda-ta ... xus/p20838According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the west's counter-insurgency strategy has "ballooned" out of proportion to the original aim of preventing al-Qaida from mounting terrorist attacks there, and must be replaced by a less ambitious but more sensible policy of "containment
and deterrence".
Richard Barrett, Coordinator, UN Monitoring Team, al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, UN Monitoring Team, al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee: If there is a money flow, it's from al-Qaeda to Taliban rather than Taliban to al-Qaeda, which is very interesting.The Afghan Taliban is a nationalist movement, and they repeatedly say that. When they look at what they've gained from their association with al-Qaeda, [it's] pretty much heavy on the negative than on the positive. They got kicked out in October 2001. Maybe if al-Qaeda hadn't attacked the United States in September 2001, they'd still be in Kabul. Now they're trying to get back. So although al-Qaeda leaders say, "Yes, Mullah Omar is our leader," operationally, it's not so strong. . . .if the Taliban were governing in Kabul, they wouldn't necessarily have al-Qaeda right behind them. Could they keep them out is the key question. In many parts of Afghanistan, particularly in Waziristan over the Durand Line, there's no way anyone's going to keep anybody out. There are hundreds of crossing points; there are villages which straddle the line. But maybe they would try. . . . I think personally that al-Qaeda is much more comfortable and better off, and far better established now, on Pakistan's side of the border.
....things to consider.Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, International Institute for Strategic Studies; former Director for Operations and Intelligence, British Secret Intelligence Service, International Institute for Strategic Studies: . . .continuing pressure by [the] International Assistance Security Force in Afghanistan and the current campaign by Pakistan against their Taliban problem--has created a situation in which the jihadist forces have come together to perhaps a greater extent than they might otherwise have done through a perception of a common threat. If it came to be that the Taliban [was] able to recover all or part of Afghanistan, I think it improbable that [its] first act would be to invite al-Qaeda back in, not least because that would of course bring with it the obvious risk that [it] would continue to be the subject of U.S. and NATO attacks. So I don't think [the leadership] wants that. But they might not be able to prevent it. If you were to ask what al-Qaeda's leadership would like to do, the answer is they would like to get back to Afghanistan if they could.
okay. now if one wants to argue that open-ended, costly large-scale war and occupation are justified for other possible reasons, such as, perhaps, general principles of justice and freedom, then fine, make that case. but is it still legitimate to keep sounding this apocalyptic world security alarm? that seems increasingly specious to me. are we doing almost as much (or more) harm as good in escalating this war? furthermore, is the war ultimately "winnable?" and what exactly will be "won?" and is it sustainable without prolonged major military occupation? didn't we already "win" this conflict once, some 9 years ago? let's look at what kind of a regime our blood and treasure is buying:
here are some articles on karzai's disaster of a regime:
from 8/23/10: http://www.examiner.com/afghanistan-hea ... zai-regime
How bad is the corruption? It is so pervasive that a majority of Afghans would welcome the return of the Taliban’s Islamic fascism if the only other alternative is continuing to live under the illegitimate Karzai regime’s reprobate incompetence and mob-like rule.
Authorities want to eliminate a surreal arrangement that allows government officials and other well-connected figures to board planes carrying suitcases packed with cash without declaring the transfers or being searched. A senior U.S. official said that serial numbers on U.S. currency were used to nail Afghanistan's former minister of Islamic affairs this year, who has been accused of extorting millions from companies seeking contracts.
On Jan. 14 a U.S.-trained special task force raided the headquarters of money transfer company New Ansari Exchange and discovered that New Ansari was helping to launder profits from the illicit opium trade and moved Taliban money that had been earned through extortion and drug trafficking. The crime unit also found links between the money transfers and some of the most powerful political and business figures in the country, including relatives of Mr. Karzai. Afghan customs documents reviewed by the Wall Street Journal indicate that $3.18 billion in cash was flown out of the country between January 2007 and February 2010... And this only includes declared amounts - the undeclared total is anybody's guess. Late last week Karzai directly intervened to win the quick release of senior aide Mohammad Zia Salehi... The latest story is that the corruption case against Salehi is wider than previously thought and Karzai wants to prevent Salehi from spilling his guts to investigators.
wow. but at least afghan women are better off now, right? that is, aside from having to endure endless war. probably. they can attend school now. i certainly won't argue that conditions aren't better for women now, but to what degree? karzai's regime has unfortunately adopted many oppressive aspects of sharia law in regard to women, a few of them cited here (11/29/10):Hamid Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali, has been implicated before for causing persons to " disappear," if you will. This is interesting because now Afghan corruption investigators say they fear for the safety of their families and do not believe it is possible to convict those close to the president.
http://revolutionaryfrontlines.wordpres ... -to-women/
The Karzai regime has adopted sharia-inspired laws related to marriage and the family that give men the right to prevent their wives from leaving the house. It is illegal for a wife not to give in to her husband's sexual demands. The Karzai's government habit of freeing men imprisoned for committing gang rape is so notorious that it even provoked a protest by the United Nations. In an interview with the BBC Persian service, Sima Samar, now the head of the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan, declared, the government institutions are a serious obstacle to women's rights in Afghanistan.
